On the 4th of February, a little over two weeks after taking his Oath of Office, Joe Biden gave his first landmark speech on foreign policy as the 46th President of the United States. There were a number of key departures from the policy approaches of his predecessor, and the President sought to bring together the various strands of his speech under one broad ideal – that there would be no longer be separation of between foreign policy and domestic policy, and that America’s return to its core values at home would be the source of the strength of its international engagement.
As expected, President Biden’s speech signalled a renewed commitment to the soft power of diplomacy as the United States’ weapon of choice in international affairs. By inclination an internationalist, President Biden reinforced the importance of building networks of support for US policies, declaring “we will repair our alliances and engage with the world once again” – ‘America First’ might now be ‘America: First Among Equals’.
But since taking office the President has also taken steps to demonstrate that the new Administration will be no soft touch. He ordered a US carrier group into the South China Sea as a demonstration of Washington’s continued commitment to ‘freedom of navigation’ operations. He had a call with the Russian President in which he made clear that he would not hesitate to confront Russian interference in US politics and state-sponsored cyber attacks.
The President also made clear in his 4February speech that the US would confront “this new moment of advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China”, and subsequently commented that Chinese President Xi “doesn’t have a democratic bone in his body” and called out China’s poor record on human rights.
What differentiates the emerging ‘Biden doctrine’ from the Trump Administration’s foreign policy is that it looks like, well, a doctrine rather than a series of reactive measures and transactional relationships. If there was any coherent foreign policy doctrine over the past four years, it was more of a ‘Pompeo doctrine’ than a ‘Trump doctrine’. It was aimed at building a network of strategically significant relationships with like-minded countries willing and able to push back on China’s inclination to use coercion rather than cooperation, and ‘might’ rather than ‘right’ to achieve its own strategic aims.
From an Australian perspective, of particular note is the fact President Biden’s newly appointed National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, recently reaffirmed that the Quad partnership between Australia, the US, India and Japan would continue play a key part in Washington’s policy in the Indo-Pacific region going forward.
In putting multilateral diplomacy at the centre of US international engagement, President Biden has made clear that US foreign policy will be “rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values: defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity”. This will inevitably lead to some difficult conversations with Chinese leaders, as the President noted that the US would also take on the “challenges posed [to] our prosperity, security, and democratic values by our most serious competitor, China”. The President continued in a similar vein when he said: “We’ll confront China’s economic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive action; to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance”.
That’s the diplomatic equivalent of throwing a right hook.
After a turbulent period when US alliances across the globe were often neglected or challenged, there will be widespread relief in many capitals to hear the President’s clear statement that “America’s alliances are our greatest asset, and leading with diplomacy means standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies and key partners once again”. With relations between Australia and China at an historic low point, that sort of reassurance is worth its weight in gold – or even iron ore – in Canberra.
We can also expect to see significant divergence from Trump-era policies in relation to environmental issues and global warming. In the President’s words, “America must lead in the face of this existential threat”, and one of President Biden’s first acts in office was to sign an Executive Order to have the US re-join the Paris Climate Agreement. Environmental and climate change issues are of particular interest to Vice-President Harris, who witnessed first-hand the devastating wild fires and droughts in her home state of California in recent years. We can expect to see her exerting significant policy influence on these issues alongside the President’s Special Envoy on climate issues, former Secretary of State John Kerry.
Also worth noting is the President’s announcement that the US would be undertaking a ‘Global Posture Review’ to ensure that that the ‘footprint’ of US military forces around the world “is appropriately aligned with [US] foreign policy and national security priorities”. Vice-President Harris has in the past spoken of the need to divert some national defense spending towards other priority areas of domestic need – is that at least one driver for this Global Posture Review?
The Review will be coordinated across all elements of national security, with Defense Secretary Austin and Secretary of State Blinken “working in close cooperation”. That reference to “all elements of national security” would indicate that the Review will likely look at the disposition of US intelligence assets as well as US military forces.
In his first few weeks in office, President Biden has made it clear that does not intend being a ‘soft touch’ for the United States’ competitors and adversaries. And he was at pains to say that “investing in our diplomacy isn’t something we do just because it’s the right thing to do for the world. We do it in order to live in peace, security, and prosperity. We do it because it’s in our own naked self-interest.” US partners and allies around the world will welcome this new definition of American ‘self-interest’, one that recognises the value of US partnerships and alliances.
So, the President’s vision for the next four years will be warmly received in those countries like Australia that have remained steadfast allies of the United States.
In Beijing and Moscow, not so much.
Sydney Avenue Consultants 